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How Manufacturing Left the West

  • Writer: Jane Park
    Jane Park
  • Jun 1
  • 2 min read
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Over the past five decades, the global manufacturing landscape has undergone a dramatic realignment. Once anchored in the industrial heartlands of Europe and North America, the center of production has steadily shifted toward the Global South—most notably to East and Southeast Asia. This transformation, often framed as inevitable or benign, has had profound consequences not only for the economies of the West but for global trade, labor markets, technological development, and geopolitical power.


This migration was not spontaneous. It was the product of deliberate choices: corporate strategies aimed at minimizing costs, trade liberalization policies that encouraged global supply chain integration, and financial incentives that favored shareholder value over long-term industrial investment. Deindustrialization in the United States, United Kingdom, and other advanced economies was often rationalized as part of the “post-industrial” shift to services and knowledge work. But the hollowing out of manufacturing employment, wages, and local economic resilience—especially in working-class regions—produced deep social and political ramifications that reverberate to this day.


At the same time, the global south—particularly China—positioned itself to absorb the exodus. Through a combination of cheap labor, infrastructural investment, export-led growth strategies, and state-supported industrial policy, China transformed itself from a peripheral assembler to the world’s dominant manufacturer. Between 1990 and 2015, its share of global manufacturing output grew from under 3% to over 25%, eclipsing even the United States. Today, China accounts for the majority of global output in key sectors such as electronics, textiles, steel, and solar panels.


Yet even as China rose, Western economies allowed their industrial capacities to atrophy. The closure of factories, the offshoring of supply chains, and the financialization of the corporate sector undermined domestic production capacity and workforce development. The consequences were not merely economic but strategic: the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent supply chain crises exposed the dangers of over-reliance on distant, concentrated production hubs.


In light of these disruptions, a critical reassessment is underway. But the question remains: has the West truly lost the industrial capacity required for resilience and global relevance? Or is a reversal of this decades-long trend still possible?

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